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Renegotiation
and Adaptation of
International Investment Contracts:
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"Renegotiation should.., be acknowledged as an
integral feature of the foreign investment process.'
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I. INTRODUCTION

In modern-day international investment practice, especially in
connection with the exploitation of natural resources, Production
Sharing Agreements have come to take over the role of the classic
concession agreement. 2 Like their predecessors, these contracts are
particularly vulnerable to disturbances in the commercial balance
agreed to, or assumed by, the parties at the conclusion of the
contract. 3 This vulnerability has three primary causes.
First, these are classic examples of long term contracts. In the
petroleum industry, the commitment of significant capital for
exploration, particularly in development, and the assumption of
considerable risk, particularly in exploration, require contracts
covering up to and over ten years of exploration, and over twenty
years of an initial production phase. 4 The long duration of these
contracts makes them particularly susceptible to political or economic
influences which are unforeseeable at the time of contract conclusion,

Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) as a special form of service contract
2.
were first used in 1967 in Indonesia. See KASSAN HOSSAIN, LAW AND POLICY IN
PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT 138 (1979); RAYMOND F. MIKESELL, PETROLEUM COMPANY
See generally Ernest E. Smith & John
OPERATIONS & AGREEMENTS 59 (1984).
Dzienkowski, A Fifty- Year Perspective on World Petroleum Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 13, 37 (1989); Irina Paliashvili, The Concept of Production Sharing, available at
http://www.rulg.com/documents/The-Conceptof _ProductionSharing.htm (last visited
Sept. 3, 2003) (explaining that production sharing agreements are "a special form of
subsoil use relations based on civil-legal contractual principles for relations between a
state and an investor with respect to prospecting, exploration and extraction of mineral
resources"). PETER FISCHER, DIE INTERNATIONALE KONZESSION 177 (1974); A.F.M.
MANIRUZZAMAN,

The New Generation of Energy and Natural Resource Development

Agreements: Some Reflections, 1993 J. OF ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 207, 213.
Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Company, 1982 I.L.M. 976, 1003
3.
(Final Award, Mar. 24, 1982) (stating that "a freely concluded agreement establishes as
a matter of principle an equilibrium of interests between the parties").
4.
Abba Kolo & Thomas W. Wdlde, Renegotiation and Contract Adaptation in
International Investment Projects, 2000 J. WORLD INVESTMENT 5, 21 (2000). See
generally STEWART MACAULYAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION (1992); FRITZ
NICKLISCH, DER KOMPLEXE LANGZEITVERTRAG (1987).
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but which from the investor's point of view have a negative effect on
the economic equilibrium of the contract.
Second, the investor will initially incur significant costs in
setting the exploration strategy in motion (sunk costs), which will
only be recovered over the duration of the contract. The investor
therefore unavoidably depends on the contract actually being carried
out for the length of time and on the basis of the framework initially
negotiated with the host country.
Third, many host countries make use of the investor's "prisoner's
dilemma," pressing for changes to the originally negotiated
equilibrium in their favor once the venture has begun, i.e. once the
investor has a large amount of sunk costs at stake. In particular, this
is likely where exploration plans have proven to be more profitable
than originally expected. These negative changes in the investment
climate occur through amendments to the relevant laws, tax
increases or a more or less forced renegotiation of the contract
5
(obsolescing bargaining):
As soon as a commercially valuable mineral is developed, the
psychology of the government is altered. The company may begin to
enjoy a high return on its investment. The government...may begin to
feel that the resource is virtually being given away. The stage is set for
renegotiation, as the original risks are forgotten. Usually the old terms
are modified and the parties adopt new terms that are more favourable
to the government than those agreed to under conditions of relative
6
uncertainty.

In addition to these conscious and controlled influences such
changes can also result from deterioration in the general economic or
political circumstances in the host country not foreseen at the time of
concluding the contract. For the investor, both scenarios are equally
problematic: profit and profitability estimates based on the
contractual equilibrium will not be met and the economic success of
the project is jeopardized.

5.
Cf. RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY 46 (1971); ERICH SCHANZE,
INVESTITIONSVERTRAGE IM INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 46 (1986); Kolo &

Wilde, supra note 4, at 23; Klaus Peter Berger, The New Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency Globalizing the Investment Insurance Approach Towards
Development, 15 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 13, 52 (1988).
6.
DAVID N. SMITH & LouIs T. WELLS, NEGOTIATING THIRD-WORLD MINERAL
AGREEMENTS 19 (1975); see also Happ, 2002 RECHT DER ENERGIE 39, 40.

Especially in the oil and gas sector disputes can arise because of the long
duration of the project. The passage of time can lead to the initial risks of the
project being forgotten and the contractual framework appearing unbalanced
once the project begins to experience success. The initial risks of the investor,
who had to bear significant costs at the start, are forgotten by the host country
and the investor's profits appear unfairly high.
Kolo & Wdlde, supra note 4, at 30.
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This article will examine ways to protect the investor against
these sorts of risks and uncertainties. Two scenarios need to be
distinguished. 7 In the first scenario discussed infra in Section II, the
contract contains no specific adjustment or renegotiation clause. In
the second scenario, discussed infra in Section III, the parties have
included special provisions in their contract to deal with these cases.

II. CONTRACT WITHOUT RENEGOTIATION CLAUSE

If the parties have not included special mechanisms for dealing
with a change in the commercial equilibrium in their contract, a
renegotiation or adjustment of the contract to changed circumstances
can be considered only where other contractual8 terms or the
applicable law provide an appropriate starting point.
A. Force Majeure Clauses and the

Hardship Concept

In cases where there is no express renegotiation clause, investors
frequently rely on either a force majeure clause included in the
contract or the hardship concept of international contract law. 9 For
example, the Lasmo Group Production Sharing Contract of August
19, 1992 between 'Vietnam National Oil and Gas Corporation of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Lasmo Vietnam Ltd. & C. Itoh Energy
Development Co., Ltd for Offshore Block 04-2" contains the following
force majeure clause:
17.7 Force Majeure
The obligations of each of the Parties hereunder, other than the
obligation to make payments of money, shall be suspended during a
period of Force Majeure and the term of the relevant period or phase of
this Agreement shall be extended for a time equivalent to the period of
Force Majeure situation. In the event of Force Majeure the Party
affected thereby shall give notice thereof to the other Party as soon as
reasonably practical stating the starting date and the extent of such
suspension of obligations and the cause thereof. A Party whose
obligations have been suspended as aforesaid shall resume the

WOLFGANG PETER, ARBITRATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF INTERNATIONAL
7.
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 322 (1995); see also Asante, supra note 1, at 418 ("Although...

some investment agreements have adopted the mechanism of expressly providing for review
or renegotiation, this trend is by no means general").
See Norbert Horn, Changes in Circumstances and the Revision of Contracts
8.
in some European Laws and in International Laws, in ADAPTATION AND
RENEGOTIATION OF CONTRACTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE 15, 29 (Norbert
Horn ed., 1985); PETER, supra note 7, at 240.
9.
Regarding the latter compare Alexei G. Doudko, Hardship in Contract: The
Approach of the UNIDROIT Principles and Legal Developments in Russia, 2000
UNIFORM L. REV. 483, 507 (2000), with the truism, 'The tendency to treat hardship as
a general rule of law is only beginning to emerge."
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performance of such obligations as soon as reasonably practical after
the removal of the Force Majeure and shall notify the other Party
accordingly.

The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts as
a restatement of the currently accepted rules and principles of
international contract law l0 define hardship and its legal
consequences as follows:
Article 6.2.2 - Definition of Hardship
There is hardship where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters
the equilibrium of the contract either because the cost of a party's
performance has increased or because the value of the performance a
party receives has diminished, and
(a)

the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party
after the conclusion of the contract;

(b)

the events could not reasonably have been taken into account
by the disadvantaged party at the time of the conclusion of the
contract;

(c)

the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party;
and

(d)

the risk of the events was not assumed by the disadvantaged
party.

Article 6.2.3 - Effects of Hardship
(1)

In case of hardship the disadvantaged party is entitled to
request renegotiations. The request shall be made without
undue delay and shall indicate the grounds on which it is
based.

(2)

The request for renegotiation does not in itself entitle the
disadvantaged party to withhold performance.

(3)

Upon failure to reach agreement within a reasonable time
either party may resort to the court.

(4)

If the court finds hardship it may, if reasonable,
(a)

terminate the contract at a date and on terms to be fixed;
or

(b)

adapt the contract
equilibrium. 1 1

with

a

view

to

restoring

its

These examples show that force majeure clauses usually provide
for an extension of the contractual performance period and the
cancellation of the contract as a measure of last resort. 12 They serve
primarily as precautions against the risks posed by economic,

10.
See generally MICHAEL BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACT LAW 19 (2d ed. 1997).
11.
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT),
Principles of International Commercial Contracts 146-51 (1994), 34 I.L.M. 1067 (1995)
[hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles].
12.
See, e.g., FIDIC General Conditions of Contract for Construction of
Building and Engineering Works Designed by the Employer, No. 19.5(a) and 19.6, Test
Edition 1998, at 56.
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political or social events 13 unforeseeable at the time contracting,
though without the aim of ensuring or re-establishing the commercial
equilibrium of the contract. However, force majeure clauses can also
contain an obligation on the parties to negotiate and to search for
ways to overcome the situation resulting from intervention by "acts of
god." Such a contract is particularly ill-suited for cancellation due to
the complexity and financial obligations already incurred by the
parties. 14 The hardship concept, in comparison, aims directly at
maintaining the commercial equilibrium of the contract in that it is
triggered when the burden posed on one party has reached the "limit
of sacrifice." As a legal consequence of hardship, the parties are
obliged to renegotiate their contractual relationship. 15 Thus, the
hardship concept proves to be a special form of the same idea
incorporated in renegotiation clauses: making contractual obligations
I6
more flexible in light of alterations to the commercial equilibrium.
Although both the hardship concept and the force majeure
clauses can, in theory, provide a starting point for the renegotiation of
the contract in case of changed circumstances, this is rarely the case
in practice. If the host country asserts a hardship or force majeure
event which it brought about itself (legislation), it cannot rely on the
clause even when the contract was not made with the state directly,
but instead with a government corporation, as is common in natural
resources exploration. These corporations are denied reliance on the
contractual force majeure clause because, in a fashion similar to
piercing the corporate veil, they are regarded as an integral
component of the state, which is responsible for the change of
17
conditions in the host country.

13.
A force majeure event is defined by Article 24 of the concession agreement
between the Bougainville Copper Party Ltd. and the Administration of Papua and New
Guinea as:
Acts of God, force majeure, floods, storms, tempests, washaways, earthquakes
or other seismic disturbances, fires, acts of war (whether declared or
undeclared), revolutions, acts of public enemies, riots, civil commotions, strikes,
lockouts, stoppages, restraints of labour or other similar acts (whether partial
or general), shortages of labour or essential materials, failure to secure
contractors, delays of contractors or any other cause or causes whatsoever.
Reprinted in SCHANZE, supra note 5, at 242.
14.
UNIDO Model Form of Semi-Turnkey Contract for the Construction of a
Fertilizer Plant
including Guidelines
and
Technical
Annexes,
art. 34,
UNIDO[Pc.74/Rev. 1 dated Feb. 1, 1985, at 127. See generally PETER, supra note 7, at
235-39.
15.
See BONELL, supra note 10, at 130.
16.
PETER, supranote 7, at 242.
17.
Cf. PETER, supra note 7, at 238-39; KARL-HEINZ BOCKSTIEGEL, DER STAAT
ALS VERTRAGSPARTNER AUSLANDISCHER PRIVATUNTERNEHMEN 328 (1971); Ekkehard

Nolting,
Hoheitliche Eingriffe
als
Force
Majeure bei
internationalen
Wirtschaftsvertrdgen mit Staatsunternehmen?, 988 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN
WlRTSCHAFT 511, 515.
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If the investor asserts a hardship or force majeure event, they
will likewise only rarely be able to achieve a renegotiation of the
contract. Should the parties fail to reach an agreement upon
renegotiation, their dispute must be decided before an international
arbitral tribunal upon which the parties will have agreed in the
contract. International arbitrators are, however, extremely reticent
when it comes to varying contracts without a specific contractual
basis.1 8 A good example of this reticence is demonstrated in the
response of an arbitral tribunal in an ad hoc arbitration award with
regard to an application by one party to have the tribunal rewrite the
content of the contract on the basis of a force majeure clause:
It is not for the Arbitral Tribunal to question the motives or judgement
of the Parties, but to assess their rights and obligations in light of their
legally significant acts or omissions. That is all; that is enough. To go
beyond this role would be to betray the legitimate expectations reflected
in the Parties' agreement to arbitrate, and indeed to impair the
international usefulness of the arbitral mechanism....
The arbitrators cannot usurp the role of government officials or
business leaders. They have no political authority, and no right to
presume to impose their personal view of what might be an appropriate
negotiated solution. Whatever the purity of their intent, arbitrators
who acted in such a fashion would be derelict in their duties, and would
create more mischief than good. The focus of the Arbitral Tribunal's
inquiry has been to ascertain the rights and obligations of the parties to
the particular contractual arrangements from which its authority is
derived. 1 9

Thus, the principle of sanctity of contracts (pacta sunt servanda)
as the leading maxim of contract law generally has priority over
changes in the surrounding economic conditions. 20 Hence, a case of
18.
Cf. ICC AWARD No. 1512 (1971), reprinted in, SIGVARD JARVIN & YVES
DERAINS, COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1974-1985 3, 3-4 (1990); No. 2708
(1976), reprinted in 104 J. DU DROIT INT'L 943 (1977); No. 2216 (1974), reprinted in 102
J. DU DROIT INT'L 917 (1975); No. 2404 (1975), reprinted in 103 J. Du DROIT INT'L 995
(1976); No. 2478 (1974), reprinted in 102 J. Du DROIT INT'L 925 (1975); No. 2699 (1976),
reprinted in 104 J. DU DROIT INT'L 945 (1977); Nos. 3099, 3100 (1979), reprinted in 8
Y.B. COM. ARB. 87, 87-92 (1982); No. 6281 (1989), reprinted in 116 J. DU DROIT INT'L
1114 (1989); No. 8486 (1996), reprinted in 125 J. Du DROIT INT'L 1047 (1998); No. 8873
(1997), reprinted in 125 J. DU DROIT INT'L 1017 (1998); JEAN FOUCHARD, L'ARBITRAGE
COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 438 (1965); NALGA NASSAR, SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS
REVISITED 205 (1995); HANS VAN HOUTTE, TRANSNATIONAL RULES IN INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 105, 109 (Gaillard ed., 1993); UGO DRAETTA ET AL., BREACH
AND ADAPTATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 200-02 (1992).
UNCITRAL Award of May 4, 1999, 25 Y.B. COM. ARB. 13, 61 (2000).
19.
20.
Cf. Norbert Horn, Adaptation and Modification of Contracts in View of a
Change of Circumstances, in TEL Aviv UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN LAW 137 (1992).
In a contract, each party accepts a certain number of risks and cannot free
itself from its obligations if a certain risk materializes. The mere fact that the
risk falls heavily on one of the parties is, as yet, not a valid legal argument for
a variation of the contract.
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force majeure exists not merely because of a change in the economic
balance of the parties' respective contractual duties, but rather only
in the classic circumstance of interference of acts of god, war, strike,
terrorist attacks, rebellion, embargo and natural or environmental
disasters, 21 unless the parties have agreed on other specific
provisions.2 2 Also, performance of the contract will not constitute
"hardship" just because the contract has become unprofitable for one
party due to changes in the economic or technical setting. 23 Rather,
only a breach of the commercial "limit of sacrifice" because of a
fundamental change in the commercial balance of the contract will
suffice. 2 4 In both cases, the change must have been unforeseeable at
the time of concluding the contract:
Parties entering into international contracts cannot claim unawareness
of the risks or macro-economic adversities. Their effects may be
extreme, but are nonetheless within the contemplation of financiers
who evaluate the reliability of borrowers on the strength of contractual
undertakings; and as they are in the contemplation of insurers who
assess their willingness to provide cover to investors who also relay on
such undertakings.
Extreme instances test the very fabric of the myriad of contracts which
are part of the foundation of international economic exchanges. It is
precisely at the extremes that the test is meaningful. An international
tribunal cannot disregard legitimate contractual expectations without
risking harm to this fabric. Arbitrators have no more business
sacrificing legal principle to perceived factual realism than a national
court can disregard contractual entitlements because it has the
25
impression that the debtor cannot factually meet its obligations.

Beneath this limit of unforeseeable fundamental change in the
contractual basis, parties to international investment contracts can
overcome the pacta sunt servanda principle only if the contract
contains a renegotiation clause. 26 Only then are international arbitral

21.
See Horn, supra note 8, at 132-34.
22.
Cf. id. at 131 (noting that "special risk" clauses can denote specific risks to
be treated as force majeure or hardship).
23.
Cf. ICC PUBLICATION No. 421, FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP S.22 (1985);
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 11, art. 6.2.1 (1994) ("Where the performance of a
contract becomes more onerous for one of the parties, that party is nevertheless bound
to perform its obligation").
24.
Marcel Fontaine, Les Clauses de Hardship-Amdnagement Conventionnel
de l'Imprdvision dans les Contrats & Long Terme, 1976 DROIT ET PRATIQUE DU
COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL 7. See Hans van Houtte, UNIDOIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts and InternationalCommercial Arbitration: Their
Reciprocal Relevance, in ICC PUBL. NR. 490/1, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS: A NEW LEX MERCATORIA?, 181, 189 (1995);

Clive M. Schmitthoff, Hardshipand Intervener Clauses, 1980 J. Bus. L. 82, 84.
25.
UNCITRAL Award of May 4, 1999, 25 Y.B. COM. ARB. 13, 64 (2000); ICC
Award No. 2142 (1974), reprinted in 2 Y.B. COM. ARB. 132 (1976).
Wolfgang Harms, Zur Anwendung von Revisionsklauseln in langfristigen
26.
Energielieferungs vertdgen, 1983 DER BETRIEB 322, 325; see also BAUR, FESTSCHRIFT
STEINDORFF 511, 512 (1985) ("By agreeing to the commercial clause the parties have
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tribunals inclined to interfere with the content of the contract when
economic conditions have changed, assuming that the applicable law
permits it.
The basis of this approach is the presumption of professional
competence of international businessmen, and the ensuing high level
of responsibility for the contents and conduct of their legal
relationships. This principle has been continuously emphasized by
international arbitral tribunals over the past decades. 27 It serves as
the standard for risk distribution within the contract. Based on this
presumption, it is assumed that the parties themselves are
responsible for taking precautions against adverse changes in the
socioeconomic circumstances by agreeing on renegotiation clauses
when concluding the contract. If they do not, force majeure clauses, or
reliance on the hardship concept, may not serve as a substitute for
their negligence at the drafting stage, and will not serve as a pretext
for deluting the pacta sunt servanda principle. 28 Rather, the parties

made it clear that the 'fair distribution of performance and counter-performance'
throughout the duration of the contract is more important to them than legal
certainty.").
27.
Cf. ICC AWARD No. 1990 (1974), reprinted in 101 J. DU DROIT INT'L 897
(1974); No. 1512 (1974), reprinted in 101 J. DU DROIT INT'L 905 (1974); No. 2291 (1975),
reprinted in 103 J.DU DROIT INT'L 989 (1976); No. 2438 (1975), reprinted in 103 J. DU
DROIT INT'L 969-971 (1976); No. 3130 (1980), reprinted in 108 J. DU DROIT INT'L 932
(1981); No. 3380 (1980), reprinted in 108 J. DU DROIT INT'L 927 (1981); No. 5364 (1988),
reprinted in 118 J. DU DROIT INT'L 1059 (1991). See generally KLAUS PETER BERGER,
THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA 301 (1999).
28.
See ICC AWARD No. 1512, reprintedin JARVIN supra note 18, at 4.
As a general rule, one should be particularly reluctant to accept it [the doctrine
rebus sic stantibus] when there is no gap or lacuna in the contract and when
the intent of the parties has been clearly expressed .... Caution is especially
called for, moreover, in international transactions where it is generally much
less likely that the parties have been unaware of the risk of a remote
contingency or unable to formulate it precisely.
Id.; see also ICC AWARD NO. 6281 (1989), reprinted in 15 Y.B. COM. ARB. 96, 98 (1990)
(noting that "[o]therwise [i.e. in the case of an intervention in the contract], any
business transaction would be exposed to uncertainty, or even be rendered impossible
all together, whenever the mutual covenants are not performed at the time at which
the contract is concluded"); Yves Derains note regarding ICC Award No. 2291 (1975),
reprinted in JARVIN supra note 18, at 275-77; Yves Derains note regarding ICC Award
No. 8486, 118 J. DU DROIT INT'L 1050 (1998); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Rendering
Arbitral Awards with Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of International
Transactions,23 COLUM. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 589, 593 (1985) (explaining that "Given the
parties' [presumed] professional sophistication as international merchants, ICC
arbitrators interpret party silence about possible future contingencies as a conscious
decision to assume the risk of such eventualities"); Bernard G. Poznanski, The Nature
and Extent of an Arbitrator's Powers in International Commercial Arbitration, 4 J.
INT'L ARB. 71, 81 (1987) (suggesting that "Parties intending to contract can protect
themselves [against the risk of changed circumstances] by fortuitous events clauses,
and in the absence of such clauses, the contract is presumed to be speculative").
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have to recognize that priority is given to fulfilling contractual
promises. Thus, the risk of adverse changes to the economic balance
of the contract below the last limit of sacrifice is to be borne by the
parties.
There are exceptions to these principles; one example is Art.
17(1) of the Russian Act on Production Sharing contracts. According
to this provision, the contract can also be varied without an
agreement between the parties, where the requirements of the
Russian Civil Code definition of a "significant change of
circumstances" have been met. 29 This brings significant uncertainty
30
into the contractual relationship.
B. Inherent Obligation to Renegotiate?
It is often argued that even without a specific contractual clause,
international investment contracts include an inherent duty to
renegotiate in light of changed circumstances. 3 1 This view is based on
various U.N. resolutions which founded the "New International
Economic Order" (NIEO) in the 1960s.3 2 In international contract
law, it derives from the principle of good faith and the duty of the
parties to cooperate 33 based on it.3 4 The U.N. Draft Code of Conduct
for Transnational Corporations also contains a provision according to

29.
Russian Act on Production Sharing Agreements, art. 17 (1995) reprinted in
35 I.L.M. 1251, 1270 (1996) ("The introduction of amendments to the agreement shall
be allowed only by consent between the parties, as well as upon request of one of the
parties in case of a significant change of circumstances as defined by the Civil Code of
the Russian Federation").
30.
See id.
31.

See SUBRATA CHOWDHURY, THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST YUGOSLAV

SEMINAR ON LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 25 (1986);
M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 197 (1994).
32.
Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res.
1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 107, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); Charterof
Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp.
No. 31, at 300, U.N. Doc A/9631 (1974). See generally JIMINEZ DE ARECHAGA, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER (1980); T.W. Walde, in A Requiem for the
"New InternationalEconomic Order" The Rise and Fall of Paradigm in International
Economic Law and a Post-Mortem With Timeless Significance, LIBER AMICORUM SEIDLHOHENVELDERN 77, 774 (Hafner, et al., eds. 1998); Norbert Horn, Normative Problems
of a New InternationalEconomic World Order, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 338 (1982).
33.
See generally NASSAR, supra note 18, at 156-167; http://www.tldb.de (on the
duty to cooperate as part of the Lex Mercatoria).
34.
ICC AWARD NO. 6219 (1990), reprinted in SIGVARD JARVIN et al.,
COLLECTION OF ICC ARBITRAL AWARDS 1986-1990 428, 431 (1994); No. 2478 (1976),
reprinted in 104 J. DU DROIT INT'L 942 (1977); No. 2291 (1975), reprinted in 103 J. DU
DROIT INT'L 989 (1976); No. 2508 (1976), reprinted in 104 J. DU DROIT INT'L 939 (1977);
Norbert Horn, Neuverhandlungspflicht, 181 ARCHIV FOR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 255
(1981). See generally infra note 131 (discussing changed nature of international
contract law).
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which these corporations should engage in renegotiation even without
a relevant contractual clause:
In the absence of contractual clauses providing for review or
renegotiation, transnational corporations should respond positively to
requests for review or renegotiation of contracts concluded with
Governments or governmental agencies in circumstances marked by
duress, or clear inequality between the parties, or where the conditions
upon which such a contract was based have fundamentally changed,
causing thereby unforeseen major distortions in the relations between
the parties and thus rendering the contract unfair or oppressive to
either of the parties. Aiming at ensuring fairness to all parties
concerned, review or renegotiation in such situations should be
undertaken in accordance with applicable legal principles and generally
35
recognized legal practices.

The last section of the quoted provision makes it clear that such a
duty to renegotiate can be taken into consideration only if the law
applicable to the contract provides for it. 36 At the transnational level
there is by no means agreement on the existence of such a duty to
renegotiate, even in light of the changing understanding of a contract
as a flexible framework for the "fair" and "reasonable" distribution of
contractual rights and obligations. 3 7 However, there are good reasons
38
to assume the existence of such a transnational legal principle.
III.

CONTRACT WITH RENEGOTIATION CLAUSE

The necessity of agreeing on specific precautions for a
subsequent alteration in the commercial balance in the contract itself
is a consequence of the combined effects just described, of force
majeure clauses or the hardship concept on one hand, and the
principle pacta sunt servanda on the other. Since neither the classic
force majeure clauses, nor the hardship concept, offer adequate
protection against an unfavorable change in the commercial balance,
investors have always tried to secure themselves against the risks of
subsequent negative changes in the economic equilibrium assumed at
the initial negotiation and conclusion of international contracts.
Conversely, host countries use this sort of clause to participate in the
investor's profit. Therefore, in the drafting practice of modern
Production Sharing contracts, the parties always agree on

35.
UN-ECOSOC 1979 Transnational Corporations: Codes of Conduct,
Formulations by the Chairman, art. 5 reprinted in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF
CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 493, 494 (Norbert Horn ed., 1980).
36.
PETER, supra note 7, at 201 ("In the absence of such provisions [on
renegotiation] it seems more appropriate to speak about a right to ask for contractual
change where the applicable law provides for such a right").
37.
See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
38.
Cf. BERGER, supra note 27, at 297.
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precautions for an unfavorable alteration in the economic equilibrium
of the contractual duties they assumed at the time of concluding the
contract.
A. Examples from Legal Practice
Some examples from international investment contracts
concluded in recent decades may illustrate the legal issues involved
with these types of adjustment or renegotiation clauses.
1. The AMINOIL Clause
Probably one of the best known-even though, for reasons of
special geo-political circumstances, unsuccessful-examples of such
clauses is contained in the Supplementary Agreement of July 29,
1961 to the concession agreement between the state of Kuwait and
the "American Independent Oil Company" (AMINOIL) of June 28,
1948. The clause was worded as follows:
Art. 9
If, as a result of changes in the terms of concessions now in existence or
as a result of the terms of concessions granted hereafter, an increase in
benefits to Governments in the Middle East should come generally to be
received by them, the Company shall consult with the Ruler whether in
the light of all relevant circumstances, including the conditions in
which operations are carried out, and taking into account all payments
made, any alterations in the terms of the agreements between the
39
Ruler and the Company would be equitable to the parties.

In a "Confidential Letter" exchanged between the parties, it was
recorded, amongst other details, that the term "benefits" in Article 9
of the Supplementary Agreement also included "arrangements not
involving payments. '40 With these words, the scope of the clause was
extended significantly. After lengthy negotiations between the state
and the U.S. concessionary, which took place against the background
of the strengthened sovereignty of host countries in the last 1960sinitially in the Near and Middle East and later worldwide-as well as
the rising oil prices in the years after 1973, the State of Kuwait
declared the end of the contract through Decree No. 124 of September
19, 1977. At the same time, the decree nationalized corporation
property. When a dispute arose between the parties as to the legality
of these measures an international arbitral tribunal decided the

39.
Cf. Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., Final Award, Mar. 24, 1982, 21 I.L.M.
976, 992, 1002 (1982); F.A. MANN, The Aminol Arbitration, in FURTHER STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 252, 252-63 (1990); PETER, supra note 7, at 103 (noting that "...
the Aminoil renegotiations were an excellent illustrative case of the general issues
arising in connection with investment contracts").
40.
Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., 21 I.L.M. at 992.
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reciprocal claims of the parties. The Ad Hoc Arbitration Agreement,
which formed the basis of the procedure and subjected all "differences
and disagreements" arising from the concession agreement to
"transnational arbitration," provided that the jurisdiction of the
arbitral tribunal was limited to deciding reciprocal payment or
damages claims because the restoration of the legal relationship of
the parties prior to Decree No. 124 as well as an adjustment to fit
41
changed economic circumstances were out of the question.
2. The Ok Tedi Clause
The "OK Tedi Papua New Guinea Concession Agreement" of
1976 contains the following brief and very general clause:
The parties may from time to time by agreement in writing add to,
substitute for, cancel or vary all or any of the provisions of this
42
Agreement.

3. The Ghana/Shell Clause
The Petroleum Production Agreement, concluded in 1974
between "The Government of Ghana and Shell Exploration and
Production Company of Ghana Ltd.," contained the following clause:
Art. 47
(b) It is hereby agreed that if during the term of this Agreement there
should occur such changes in the financial and economic circumstances
relating to the petroleum industry, operating conditions in Ghana and
marketing conditions generally as to materially affect the fundamental
economic and financial basis of this Agreement, then the provisions of
this Agreement may be reviewed or renegotiated with a view to making
such adjustments and modifications as may be reasonable having
regard to the Operator's capital employed and the risks incurred by him
always provided that no such adjustments or modifications shall be
made within 5 years after the commencement of production of
petroleum in commercial quantities from the production area and that
43
they shall have no retroactive effect.

4. The Lasmo Clause
The Lasmo Group Production Sharing Contract of August 19,
1992 between the "Vietnam National Oil and Gas Corporation of the
Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Lasmo Vietnam Ltd. & C. Itoh Energy

41.
42.
note 18, at
43.
supra note

Id. at 979.
"OK Tedi" Papua New Guinea Concession Agreement, in NASSAR, supra
175.
On-Shore (Voltaian Basin) Petroleum Production Agreement, in Asante,
1, at 417.
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04-2" contained

the

Art. 17.8 Introduction of New Laws and Regulations
If after the Effective Date, new law(s) and/or regulation(s) are
introduced in Vietnam adversely affecting CONTRACTOR'S interest, or
any amendments to existing laws and/or regulations are made then the
Parties shall meet and consult each other and shall make the necessary
changes to this Agreement to ensure that CONTRACTOR is restored to
the same economic conditions which would have prevailed if the new
law and/or regulation or amendment had not been introduced.

In Article 11, the contract contains an arbitration agreement for "all
disputes arising out of or in connection to the contract." In Article
17.9 the parties are granted the right to present all "questions, which
are in substance of a technical nature" to an "independent expert of
international reputation."
5. The Qatar Clause
The 'Model Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement" of
the Sheikdom of Qatar of 1994 contains amongst others the following
clause:
Art. 34.12 Equilibrium of the Agreement
Whereas the financial position of the Contractor has been based, under
the Agreement, on the laws and regulations in force at the Effective
Date, it is agreed that, if any future law, decree or regulation affects
Contractor's financial position, and in particular if the customs duties
exceed ... percent during the term of the Agreement, both Parties shall
enter into negotiations, in good faith, in order to reach an equitable
solution that maintains the economic equilibrium of this Agreement.
Failing to reach agreement on such equitable solution, the matter may
44
be referred by either Party to arbitration pursuant to Article 31.

B. Similaritiesand Differences
The special characteristics of the clauses presented above become
clear when compared with classic stabilization clauses. 45 The latter
are designed to protect the investor by "freezing" the legal situation
in the host country at the time of concluding the contract (clause de
gel). Unavoidably, they come into conflict with the sovereignty of the
host country. 46 To avoid this, and because of the questionable legal
validity of these clauses, the renegotiation clauses cited above aim to

44.
Model Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement, in BERNARDINI,
ICSID REV.-FILJ 411, 416 (1998).
45.
See id. at 418; M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
DISPUTES 54 (2000); Kolo & Wdlde, supra note 4, at 43.
46.
Cf. HANNO MERKT, INVESTITIONSSCHUTZ DURCH STABILISIERUNGSKLAUSELN
237 (1990).
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protect the investor, not by establishing a fixed legal situation in
advance, but conversely by making the contractual framework
flexible and dynamic throughout the duration of the contract in case
the host country changes the economic circumstances by "sovereign"
acts. Comparing both approaches-freezing there, allowing for
flexibility here 47-reveals the classic conflict of interests between host
country and investor which has always characterized the law of
international investment contracts:
A major source of conflict between host governments of developing
from
the
derives
corporations
and transnational
countries
preoccupation of transnational corporations with stability and
predictability in contractual relations on the one hand, and the
persistent demands of host governments for a more flexible contractual
48
regime on the other.

The more flexible contractual regime gained through the
renegotiation clause leaves the host country's sovereignty intact
because it is a private law agreement on the renegotiation of the
contract. To guarantee this flexibility, the contractual provisions
must unavoidably be "open" in style. Therefore, they tend to exhibit
significant uncertainty. This applies especially to the following key
issues:
(trigger

1.

the definition of events triggering the duty to renegotiate
events);

2.

the exact content of the contractual obligations, in particular
the question of an obligation to negotiate as well as
the question of an obligation to reach a (particular?) result;

3. the legal consequences of failure to fulfil the contractual obligation
to negotiate;
4.

the enforceability of the obligation to negotiate before an
international arbitral tribunal, in particular the authority of the
tribunal to adapt the contract to the changed circumstances in lieu
of the parties.

For investors, the answers to these questions are of essential
importance to their risk planning. They determine the ease of use and
efficiency of these clauses. Only when a certain amount of pressure is
applied to the host country in regard to the ability of the clauses to
function is it certain that the protection of the investor is not just on
paper. Only then will the clause also fulfill its function in the realm of
"conflict avoidance," i.e. in the lead up to an argument over
renegotiation and adaptation of the contract.

47.
48.

Id. at 253.
Asante, supra note 1, at 404.
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C. Definition of "TriggerEvents"
The ability of a renegotiation clause to function in practice is
dependent, above all, on the prerequisites for initiating a consensual
procedure being clearly defined in the clause.4 9 The unavoidable
openness of these clauses, however, is in direct contradiction to the
necessity for concrete definitions. Hence, it is the nature of these
50
clauses that they can never cover every conceivable case.
According to the duration and complexity of each contract,
different approaches to determining the trigger to review can be
found. Whereas some clauses, such as in the Ok Tedi contract, do not
provide for any prerequisites to the consensus procedure, 51 others
provide for very general conditions. For example, Article 9 of the
AMINOIL contract 52 makes the obligation to renegotiate dependent
on the existence of an "increase in benefits to Governments in the
Middle East ... generally to be received by them." Article 47(b) of the
Ghana/Shell contract 5 3 requires "such changes in the financial and
economic circumstances relating to the petroleum industry, operating
conditions in Ghana and marketing conditions generally as to
materially affect the fundamental economic and financial basis of this
Agreement." The latter formulation in particular makes clear the
issues involved with this sort of renegotiation clauses. The change in
the commercial balance of the contract can barely be defined more
concretely. Trigger events evade a detailed definition as they are
complex, unforeseen, and influenced by naturally volatile economic
determinants. These clauses can be qualified as "general review
clauses." Other clauses, however, link the trigger of the procedure to
the occurrence of one or more events defined more precisely in the
clause, such as tax increases, price changes for raw materials, or in
the event that a specific risk materializes (special risk clauses). From
the perspective of contract control, the latter types of clauses have the
advantage of determining more precisely the beginning of the
adaptation procedure. 54 However, this comes at a cost: the
disadvantage of having agreed to overcome the notion of sanctity of
contract only for a specific, more or less strictly limited, type of risk.

49.
Cf. Horn, supra note 8, at 129 (observing that "[tlhe defining of a particular
event which will trigger review is the most salient feature of a special review clause").
50.
Cf. WILLIAM F. Fox, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 221 (3d ed.
1998) (arguing that "express contractual language will not totally eliminate risk- there
is virtually nothing that can accomplish this").
51.
See discussion supra note 42 and accompanying text.
52.
See discussion supra note 39 and accompanying text.
53.
See discussion supra note 43 and accompanying text.
54.
Cf. Horn, supra note 8, at 129 (nothing that "[i]n most cases, the parties are
well advised to be quite specific as to the adaptation mechanism..."); Bernardini,
supra note 44, at 419 ("The parties' obligations.., should be precisely defined").
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In view of the difficulties in formulating a general renegotiation
clause that defines specifically when a change of circumstances and
its impact is serious enough to trigger a renegotiation, many
negotiators of modern investment agreements do not include such
general clauses. 55 In that case an "analogous" application of these
specific clauses to other general risks below the hardship and force
majeure threshold generally will not be considered. 56 This follows
from the presumption presented above in favor of the professional
competence of the contracting parties in international commercial
contract law. It is assumed that the parties would have included such
a clause in the contract if they wanted one. An extension of the
specific clause to other risks not regulated there would therefore be in
contradiction of the parties' presumed intentions.
D. The Parties'Obligationsin Reaching Agreement
Alongside determining the events triggering the renegotiation
process, fixing or determining the contractual obligations of the
parties in the context of that process is of decisive importance for the
efficiency of a clause and its legal enforceability. Renegotiation
clauses often contain only a broad guide to the standard to be applied
to reaching an agreement. Often reference is made to "good faith,"
"fairness and equity" or the goal of reconstructing the "contractual
'57
equilibrium as intended by and in the initial spirit of the contract.
The Lasmo clause is more pronouncedly oriented to preserving the
commercial status quo ante and requires that "necessary changes to
this Agreement" be made "to ensure that CONTRACTOR is restored
to the same economic conditions which would have prevailed if the
58
new law and/or regulation or amendment had not been introduced.
1. General Obligations During Negotiations
In themselves, these formulations say very little. The most one
can infer from them is that in the first case the "hic et nunc" fair
decision should typically be aimed for, whereas in the other two cases
more consideration should be given to the original equilibrium
expectations of the parties. In actuality, it must be assumed that,

55.
Kolo & Walde, supranote 4, at 47.
56.
NASSAR, supra note 18, at 178; van Houtte, supra note 18, at 105, 110; ICC
Award No. 2478 (1974), 3 Y.B. COM. ARB. 222 (1978) (contractual adjustment clause for
currency fluctuations not applicable to collapse in commodity prices); No. 2216 (1974),
reprinted in 102 J. DU DROIT INT'L 917 (1975); No. 2291 (1975), reprinted in 103 J. DU
DROIT INT'L 989 (1976); No. 5953 (1989), reprinted in 117 J. DU DROIT INT'L 1056 (1990).
57.
PETER, supra note 7, at 244; NASSAR, supra note 18, at 178.
58.
Cf. supra part III.A.4.
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unless there are indications to the contrary, the parties always (even
after their contract has undergone an adaptation process) wish to
preserve the equilibrium of their contractual obligations as expressed
in the contract. 59 The idea that the performance obligations of the
parties should be commercially equivalent is a general principle of
international commercial contract law. 60 Therefore it also applies
when not expressly included in the wording of the contract, as, for
61
example, with the OK-Tedi clause.
Independent of the formulation of each clause, a catalogue of
more or less concrete party obligations can be derived from the
inherent function of this type of clause which must be fulfilled in a

renegotiation procedure. This catalogue is based on three basic
considerations: first, despite their unavoidable uncertainty, these
kinds of clauses are not empty shells. Rather, by agreeing to the

clause,

both

parties

are legally

obliged

to cooperate

in

the

renegotiation procedure in an efficient manner, i.e. in a manner
aimed at successfully negotiating a solution. This requires, above all,
62
earnest efforts, flexibility (as a vital component of these clauses)
and a willingness to consider the needs and interests of the other
party. The arbitral tribunal in the AMINOIL arbitration interpreted
the clauses according to their purpose and referred to the position
taken by the International Court of Justice in its Continental Shelf
decision 63 to summarize the content of the obligation as follows:
[Neither side has neglected] the general principles that ought to be
observed in carrying out an obligation to negotiate, - that is to say, good
faith as properly to be understood; sustained upkeep of the negotiations
over a period appropriate to the circumstances; awareness of the

59.
PETER, supra note 7, at 244; NASSAR, supra note 18, at 178.
60.
See ICC AWARD No. 2291 (1975), reprinted in JARVIN, supra note 18, at 274
("toute transaction commerciale est fondde suO l'equilibre des prestations rdciproques et ...
nier ce principe reviendrait d faire du contrat commercial un contrat aldatoire,fond6 sur la
speculation ou le hasard); Ernst Steindorff, Vorvertrag zur Vertrags dnderung, 1983
BETRIEBS-BERATER 1127 (referring to German law trade practices, i.e. 'Verkehrssitte' or
'Handelsbrauch'. See generally Gino Idrcher, Die Anpassung langfristiger Vertrdge an
verdnderte Umstdnde, in DER BETRIEB 1269 (1996)

61.
See "OK Tedi" Papua New Guinea Concession Agreement, in NASSAR, supra
note 18, at 175.
62.
Cf. Horn, supra note 8, at 122 (correctly referring to "built-in contractual
flexibility," introduced into the contractual framework by these clauses).
63.
North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 47 (Feb. 16).
Defining the content of the obligation to negotiate, the Permanent Court, in its
Advisory Opinion in the case of Railway Traffic between Lithuaniaand Poland,
said that the obligation was 'not only to enter into negotiations but also to
pursue them as far as possible with a view to concluding agreements,' even if
an obligation to negotiate did not imply an obligation to reach agreement.
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interests of the other party; and a preserving quest for an acceptable
64
compromise.

Second, the function of these clauses is limited to adapting the
contract to the changed circumstances. They do not justify a
restructuring of the entire contract unless this is clearly expressed in
the clause. Third, in this sort of consensus procedure, the prohibition
to cause damages to the other side and to exploit the other party's
65
weakness to the detriment of that party is exceedingly important.
Both principles can be understood as a continuation into the
consensus-finding phase of the general obligation to cooperate 66 in
the performance of the contract, an obligation to which all parties to a
long-term international contract are subject. 6 7 Renegotiation clauses
should not result in a commercial advantage to one of the parties, but
instead, function either to maintain or to restore the commercial
balance of the contract to adjust to changed circumstances.
Accordingly, the obligations to which the parties to a
renegotiation clause are subject can be defined as follows:
1.

Keeping to the negotiation framework set out by the clause,

2.

Respecting the remaining provisions of the contract,

3.
4.

Having regard to the prior contractual practice between the
parties,
Making a serious effort to reach agreement,

5.

Paying attention to the interests of the other side,

6.
7.

Producing information relevant to the adaptation,
Showing a sincere willingness to reach a compromise,

8.

Maintaining flexibility in the conduct of negotiations,

9.

Searching for reasonable and appropriate adjustment solutions,
10. Making concrete and reasonable suggestions for adjustment
instead of mere general declarations of willingness,
11. Avoiding rushed adjustment suggestions,
12. Giving appropriate reasons for one's own adjustment suggestions,
13. Obtaining expert
proceedings,

advice

in difficult

and complex consensus

14. Responding promptly to adjustment offers from the other side,

64.
See Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., Final Award, Mar. 24, 1982, 21 I.L.M.
976, 1014 (1982).
65.
See ICC AWARD No. 2291 (1975), reprinted in JARVIN, supra note 18, at 274.
66.
See generally UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 11, art. 5.3; ICC Award No.
4761 (1987), reprinted in JARVIN, supra note 34, at 519; No. 5030 (1992), reprinted in
120 J. Du DROIT INT'L 1004, 1014 (1993) (note by Derains); BERGER, supra note 27, at
298.
67.
See ICC AWARD No. 2291 (1975), reprinted in JARVIN, supra note 18, at 277
(note by Derains); FRITZ NICKLISCH, PARTNERSCHAFrLICHE INFRASTRKURPROJEKTE
149, 157 (1996).

1366

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL. 36:1347

15. Making an effort to maintain the price-performance relationship
taking into consideration the parameters regarded as relevant by
the parties,
16. Avoiding an unfair advantage or detriment to the other side ("no
profit - no loss" principle),
17. Prohibition on creating established facts during negotiations except
in emergency situations (ban on "escalation" strategies),
18. Maintaining efforts to reach agreement over an appropriate length
of time, and
68
19. Avoiding unnecessary delays in the consensus proceedings.

Within a given renegotiation process, none of these obligations
have sole validity. Rather, they are starting points for determining
what is required of the parties in each individual case by examining
together the wording of the clause, the nature of the contract and the
combined effect of its provisions, the consensus criteria set out in the
clause, the purpose 69 the parties intended the clause to serve and the
type of risks realized.7 0 The various factors will be summing up
subject to the principle of good faith and, in particular, the notions of
fairness and reasonableness derived therefrom. 71 Thus, a party will
be subject to fewer requirements if the opposite side also makes no
moves to support the negotiation process. This follows from the idea
of cooperation as a distributor of legal duties, on which most of the
above-mentioned obligations are based. The idea of an asymmetrical
distribution of information also needs to be considered when
summing up. Following this, the obligation of one party to make its
own suggestions during the renegotiation process is proportionately
smaller insofar as the other party is in a better position to make
progress towards a solution due to technical conditions or the
distribution of risks in the contract. Timing also has a role to play in
determining the negotiation obligations of the parties. The obligation
to provide concrete suggestions for a solution needs to be fulfilled to
an increasingly higher standard the further the negotiations proceed.

See Horn, supra note 8, at 15, 28; Horn, supra note 34, at 255, 284; ANDREAS
68.
NASSAR, supra note 18, at 180; NELLE, NEUVERHANDLUNGSPFLICHTEN 272 (1994);
JORGEN BAUR, VERTRAGLICHE ANPASSUNGSREGELN 120 (1983); PETER, supra note 7, at
246; Nicklisch, supra note 67, at 156; Steindorff, supra note 60, at 1130; Kolo & Wdlde,
supra note 4, at 57; UNCITRAL, LEGAL GUIDE ON DRAWING UP INTERNATIONAL
CONTRACTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL WORKS 246 (1998); Kuwait v. Am.
Indep. Oil Co., supra note 39, at 1014; Wintershall A.G. v. Gov't of Qatar, 28 ILM 798,
814 (1989); ICC AWARD NO. 2291 (1975), reprinted in JARVIN, supra note 18, at 277 (note
by Derains); North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 63, at 47.
These might include covering costs or increasing or protecting value. See
69.
BAUR, supra note 68, at 77.
49-70) (discussing
See Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., 21 I.L.M. at 1009 (
70.
the course of such a negotiation and its adjudication by an international arbitral
tribunal); see also NASSAR, supra note 18, at 183.
71.
HORN, supra note 8, at 28; PETER, supra note 7, at 206; NELLE, supra note
68, at 290; ICC AWARD NO. 2508 (1976), reprinted in JARVIN, supra note 18, at 292.
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2. Duty to Negotiate or Duty to Agree?
If the negotiations fail to make progress, threaten to collapse, or
have failed, the question arises whether the parties are obliged to
reach an agreement. This is especially problematic because clauses
aimed just at negotiation do not contain the same level of clearly
defined performance terms as do "hard" contractual provisions, for
example those on payment of a purchase price or delivery, or
manufacture of the contractual object. In the interests of an
efficiency-oriented interpretation of such clauses, German law
provides that an obligation of the parties to reach agreement exists in
this respect if the adjustment criteria and adjustment aim have been
defined to sufficient clarity. 72 Internationally, however, another point
of view prevails. The result is based on the particular quality of
renegotiation clauses. Contrary to "one-dimensional" contract clauses,
these open clauses refer to several possible consensus options. Which
one will be applicable in the end cannot be fixed in advance; instead,
it depends on various circumstances, like the negotiation strengths of
the parties and their respective commercial circumstances at the time
of negotiation as well as the parties' strategic aims and options. These
circumstances are not fixed in advance, and cannot be evaluated in
an objective legal sense. These considerations apply regardless of how
strongly adaptation standards and aims have been clarified in the
clause. According to unanimous international opinion, renegotiation
clauses only contain an obligation on the parties to make the best
possible effort to reach an agreement within the framework of the list
presented above. They do not, however, require the parties to
actually reach an agreement. 73 This has been repeatedly determined
in particular in connection with adjusting Concession or Production
75
Sharing Agreements 74 as well as in the context of international law.

72.
See Horn, supra note 8, at 283; Norbert Horn, Vertragsbindung unter
verdnderten Umstdnden, 38 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1118, 1123 (1985);
Steindorff, supra note 60, at 1128; STEFAN KROLL, ERGANZUNG UND ANPASSUNG VON
VERTRAGEN DURCH SCHIEDSGERICHTE 154 (1999); Lrcher, supra note 60, at 1270;
German Federal Supreme Court, Apr. 8, 1968, VIII ZR 1 8/66, in WM 1968, 575;
German Federal Supreme Court, Mar. 8, 1973, II ZR 134/71, in BETRIEBS-BERATER
1973, 723.
73.
Schmitthoff, supra note 24, at 87; Fontaine, supra note 24, at 75; DurandBarthez, D.P.C.I. 357, 371 (1984); NASSAR, supra note 18, at 180; PETER, supra note 7,
at 247; Nicklisch, supra note 67, at 156; Bernardini, supra note 44, at 419; BAUR, supra
note 68, at 120; NELLE, supra note 6, at 68; UGo DRAETTA ET AL., supra note 18, at 197.
74.
Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., 21 I.L.M. at 1004 ("An obligation to negotiate
is not an obligation to agree"); WintershallA.G. v. Gov't of Qatar,supra note 68, at 814,
841 ("it is clear that such a duty [to negotiate] does not include an obligation ... to
reach agreement ... [nor is] the Government [is not] legally required to enter into such
an agreement, however reasonable it may be").
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These types of clauses therefore do not establish any liability of the
parties based on the failed success of the renegotiation process, rather
they have an effect similar to "best efforts" clauses. 76 The duty to
negotiate based on a renegotiation clause can therefore still be
fulfilled even if the parties do not reach an agreement, e.g. because
one party rejects the other side's proposals for reasons that are based
on normal commercial judgment. 77 Any other view would fail.
Because of their openness, these clauses can only set a generally
determined goal (guaranteeing the commercial balance between the
parties' contractual obligations) and provide for the procedure
(negotiation) to be followed by both parties, but they can never set the
actual manner in which this aim should be reached, e.g. by setting
definite alternatives to be decided. 78 In that way, renegotiation
clauses allocate authorisation for adjustment to both parties together
with all the unpredictable elements necessarily involved. This means
that these clauses result in process-oriented, 79instead of successoriented, contractual obligations for both parties.
E. Claims for Damages
Party liability for damages arising from a breach of the
contractual obligations derived from the clause only comes into
consideration in exceptional cases.80 Here too, the special legal nature
of these clauses should be taken into account. Merely not reaching

75.
Permanent Ct. of Int'l Justice In re Ry. Traffic between Lithuania and
Poland, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, at 116 (noting that "an obligation to negotiate does not
imply an obligation to reach an agreement"); North Sea Continental Shelf Case, supra
note 63; NASSAR, supra note 18, at 180.
76.
Cf. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 11, art. 5.4(2) ("To the extent that an
obligation of a party involves a duty of best efforts in the performance of an activity,
that party is bound to make such efforts as would be made by a reasonable person of
the same kind in the same circumstances").
See NASSAR, supra note 18, at 182; NELLE, supra note 68, at 17; Kolo &
77.
Wdlde, supra note 4, at 73.
78.
See BAUR, supra note 68, at 120.
See NELLE, supra note 68, at 278.
79.
The aim of the renegotiation obligation is to achieve an exchange of suggestions
for adjustment. However, just like the ultimate goal of reaching an agreement
between the parties, this aim can only be served in a limited way by direct
content provisions and additional indirect support, especially in the form of
procedural regulations, is needed.
Id. Cf. CHRISTIAN BURHING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 222 (1996) (elaborating generally on the negotiation process and its
theoretical concept); HENRY BROWN & ARTHUR MARRIOT, ADR PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE § 6-001 (2d ed. 1999).
See supra notes 3, 24 and accompanying text; see also House of Lords in
80.
Walford v. Miles, 2 A.C. 128, 128 (1992).
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agreement will not in itself constitute a breach of obligation.8 1
Instead, this is assumed where the non-agreement is proven to be
caused by a gross breach of obligation in bad faith by the other side.
This could be the case, for example, where proceedings are
unjustifiably delayed,8 2 when negotiations are intentionally
obstructed8 3 or where proposals by one side are obviously rejected for
reasons other than normal business judgement. Only under these
circumstances can it be assumed that a reasonable person in a
84
comparable situation would have made greater efforts.
In such a situation, the problem arises as to how to prove that
the behavior of the other party constituted the reason for the failure
of the renegotiation.8 5 Beyond this, problems will also exist when
attempting to quantify the exact damage caused. If one were to grant
the party a claim for damages for non-performance, the arbitral
tribunal would have to compare the situation which has arisen with a
possible successful negotiation outcome. In this way, the tribunal
would be forced indirectly, i.e. via the calculation of damages, actively
to structure the agreement. For this reason, such an approach is not
practicable. 8 6 Therefore, only classic damages from delay and costs
incurred in reliance on reaching an agreement are recoverable.8 7 In
order to avoid these difficulties in measuring damages in advance, the
88
parties should include liquidated damage amounts in the clause.
It should be noted, independently of these practical problems,
that even the failure of the consensus procedure where one party is at
89
fault will not change the original contractual distribution of risk.
The contract remains in force, unless the parties have determined
otherwise in the clause9" or have clearly expressed via the adjustment

81.
Cf. Mobil Oil Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 16 CTR 3, 47 (examining Iran U.S. Claims
Tribunal).
82.
Here, it is generally assumed that each party has the right to carefully
consider its position. Unavoidable delays in negotiations which arise as a result of this
must be accepted and do not lead to any liability for damages of the delaying party.
83.
See PETER, supra note 7, at 247; NASSAR, supra note 18, at 182;
BERNARDINI, supra note 44, at 421; NICKLISCH, supra note 67, at 159; BAUR, supra note

68, at 120; Durand-Barthez, supra note 73, at 72. See generally Dietrich Maskow, in
DIE

ANPASSUNG

LANGFRITIGER

VERTRAGE

IM

INTERNATIONALEN

WIRTSCHAFTSVERKEHR (Kotz & von Marschall eds., 1984).
84.
Cf. supra note 76.
85.
Cf. Durand-Barthez, supra note 73, at 357, 372.
86.
See also Maskow, supra note 83, at 98; NELLE, supra note 68, at 328.
87.
See Horn, supra note 34, at 255, 287; NELLE, supra note 68, at 328.
88.
See Horn, supra note 34, at 255, 287. See generally Klaus Peter Berger,
Vertragsstrafen und Schadenspauschalierungenim Internationalen Wirtschaftsvertragsrecht,
1999 RECHT DER IINTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFr 401, 406.

89.
NICKLISCH, supra note 67, at 159.
90.
See PETER, supra note 7, at 248; NASSAR, supra note 18, at 179. ICC Award
No. 2478, 3 Y.B. COM. ARB. 222 (1978).
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clauses that the validity of the contract is restricted to the
circumstances as they existed at the time of concluding the contract. 9 1
Finally, it is also conceivable that a party which does not accept an
offer from the other side within the framework of the consensus
structure is in breach of its general duty to minimize loss, and that
would be to its detriment when calculating its claim for damages. 92 In
93
this way liability could also be assessed proportionately.
F. ProceduralEnforceability
1. The Significance of Arbitration
Alongside the enforceability of renegotiation clauses in
international investment contracts as a matter of substantive law,
the procedural aspects of the renegotiation obligations manifested in
them is of particular practical importance. International arbitration
plays a decisive part in this. Nearly all Production Sharing contracts
contain an arbitration clause. In some cases the contract contains no
express link between the renegotiation clause and the arbitration
clause. 94 In other cases, the arbitral tribunal is not just authorized to
decide general disputes arising from the contract, but also it is
expressly provided in the contract that the parties also have the right
to call on the arbitral tribunal designated in the contract to decide on
the adjustment of the contract on behalf of the parties if negotiations
on adaptation foreseen in the contract have failed. 95 Typically, the
contracts contain arbitration clauses which refer to the Rules of
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)96 or the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 97 Frequently the contracts also
contain arbitration agreements that refer to the arbitration
mechanism for investment disputes of the World Bank (International

91.
Cf. KROLL, supra note 72, at 154.
92.
ICC Award No. 2478, 1978 Y.B. COM. ARB. 222; Note by Derains regarding
Award No. 2291 in JARVIN & DERAINS, supra note 18, at 277.
93.
See PETER, supra note 7, at 250 (referring to the unpublished ICC Award
No. 4724); cf. NICKLISCH, supra note 67, at 150.
94.
Cf. supra discussion in part III.A.4 of Lasmo Group Production Sharing
Contract arts. 11 and 17.8.
95.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
96.
ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION, ICC Publication No. 808. See generally YVES
DERAINS & ERIC A. SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE NEW ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION
(1998); SCHAFER, VERBIST & IMHOOS, DIE ICC SHIEDSGERICHTSORDNUNG IN DER PRAXIS

(2000).
97.
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law and Aribitration Rules of
April 28, 1976. See generally JACMIJN J. VAN HOF, COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL
ARBITRATION RULES: THE APPLICATION BY THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1991);
STEWART A. BAKER & MARK D. DAVIS, THE UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES IN
PRACTICE (1992).
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8
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, ICSID). 9 The
ICSID System differs from the other "private" arbitration rules in
that it is based on an international law convention 99 and can only be
taken into consideration if the host country has ratified the
convention and the parties have agreed on ICSID arbitration. The
consent of the host country can also be declared in advance in a
bilateral investment protection treaty (BIT), so that arbitration will
be permissible even without an arbitration agreement between the
host country and the investor. 10 0

2. Differences about Contractual Adaptation as "Legal Disputes"?
Despite these basic differences between "private" arbitration and
the ICSID system, based on international law and largely isolated
from national procedural law, the same question on the jurisdiction of
the arbitral tribunal to adapt the contract arises in both areas. This
question is whether a "dispute" or "legal dispute" exists in particular
cases, as international arbitration laws e.g. Sec. 1029(1) German
Arbitration Law just like Article 7(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration and Article 25(1) of the
11
In
ICSID Convention seem to require for initiating an arbitration?'
answering this question, two groups of cases need to be distinguished.
a. Non-doubtful Cases
In the first group of cases there is no doubt that a dispute exists
as a prerequisite for initiating an arbitration. This applies, for
example, if the parties are in dispute about the interpretation of the
renegotiation clause. Hence, there can be a dispute between the
parties as to whether the prerequisites for initiating the consensus
procedure (trigger events) have been fulfilled, whether the conditions
agreed to in the clause for an automatic adaptation (price

Cf. MOESHE HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATOIN MECHANISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL
98.
CENTER FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (1993); Georges Delaume, Le

Cantre International pour le reglement des Diffdrends relatifs aux Investissements
(CIRDI), 109 J. DU DROIT INT'L 775 (1982); RICHARD HAPP, SCIEDSVERFAHRN ZWISCHEN
STAATEN UND INVESTOREN NACH ARTIKEL 26 ENERGIECHARTAVERTRAG (2000).

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and
99.
nationals of other states (ICSID) of 18 March, 1965, reprintedin II INTERNATIONALER
RECHTSVERKEHR IN ZIVIL- UND HANDELSSACHEN, No. 720, at 34 (Arthur Billow et al.
eds. Supp. 1991).
See Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Repub. of Zaire, I.L.M. 1544 (ICSID
100.
Award); Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 I.C.S.I.D. REV. FOREIGN INV.
L.J. 232, 236-41 (1995); Happ, supra note 6, at 43 (regarding Article 26 of the Energy
Charter).
101.

Cf. BERNARDINI, supra note 44, at 421.
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adjustment) have been met, or whether in the case of a failed
agreement between the parties the conditions for a damages claim for
breach of contract in terms of the renegotiation clause have been
fulfilled.10 2 It is also possible for the host country to breach the
contract during negotiations or even, as in the AMINOIL case,
expropriate the investor. In all these cases a "dispute" or "legal
dispute" clearly exists between the parties. The arbitral tribunal
therefore is not called upon to make a creative legal decision but
rather to decide the rights and obligations of the parties. The arbitral
tribunal in the AMINOIL case therefore accurately confirmed its
jurisdiction to decide the parties' claims for damages:
[I]n the present case, the Tribunal thinks that it is not really a question
of modifying or completing the contract of concession. The Tribunal is
not expected to devise new provisions that will govern the contractual
relations of the Parties for the future, but to liquidate the various
consequences of their past conduct and of the contractual clauses that
once bound them but are now at an end. Under this head, the
Arbitration Agreement founding the competence of the Tribunal is
widely drawn, and confers jurisdiction to investigate whether . . . a
103
liability can be ascribed to Aminoil.

In these cases, therefore, the tribunal's decision concerns a dispute
between the parties in the sense of the national laws or Article 25(1)
10 4
of the ICSID Convention.
b. Doubtful Cases
In the second group of cases, the parties do not want a decision
from the tribunal on the interpretation of the renegotiation clause in
order subsequently to enter the negotiation phase. Instead, the
arbitral tribunal itself is called upon to undertake the adjustment for
the parties at the request of one of them. There has always been a
debate as to whether a "dispute" or "legal dispute" exists in these
cases. The reason is found in the special nature of renegotiation

102.
According to what has been said above, this will only rarely be the case. Cf.
Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., 21 I.L.M. 976, 1003 (1982).
103.
Id. at 1016.
104.
Fritz Nicklisch, Die Ausfiillung von Vertragslicken durch das
Schiedsgericht, 35 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 15, 17 (1989); Maskow,
supra note 83, at 97; PETER, supra note 7, at 254-322; BERNARDINI, supra note 44, at
420; KROLL, supra note 72, at 19; see also Georges Delaume, ICSID Arbitration:
PracticalConsiderations, 1 J. INT'L ARB. 101, 116-17; Georges Delaume, ICSID and the
Transnational Financial Commentary on the ICSID Convention, 11 I.C.S.I.D. REV.
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 237, 242 (1986); Christoph Schreuer, Commentary on the ICSID
Convention, 11 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L. J. 318, 343 (1996); J. Barrigan
Marcantonio, ICSID as a Forum for the Renegotiation and Adaptation of Contracts, in
ADAPTATION

AND RENEGOTIATION

OF CONTRACTS IN INTERNATIONAL

TRADE AND

FINANCE 235, 238 (Norbert Horn ed. 1985); Klaus Peter Berger, Power of Arbitrators to
Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to Make Sense, FOUNDATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 269, 274 (Ian Fletcher et al. eds., 2001).
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clauses. Because the possible negotiation outcome is so open, a
difference of opinion between the parties as to the way to adjust the
contract is not suited to classical arbitral adjudication in the sense of
a clear "yes or no" decision.1 0 5 Rather, an agreement between the
parties on changing individual contractual obligations or adapting
them to the changed economic conditions should be replaced by a
ruling by the arbitral tribunal. With regard to the openness of the
possible decision, however, the arbitrators are no longer being called
upon to make a legal decision but, rather, to shape the contractual
relationship for the parties.
3. The Traditional "Dispute Oriented" Understanding of Arbitration
Even if in light of the currently dominant principle of a broad
interpretation of international arbitration agreements, such decisions
can be regarded as being covered by the parties' intentions 0 6 and the
applicable substantive law permits an adjustment by third parties,
the question remains whether arbitral tribunals are procedurally
authorized to make such decisions.' 0 7 Some arbitration acts, such as
the Dutch Act,' 0 8 Bulgarian Act, 10 9 or the new Swedish Arbitration
Act 10 provide for such a jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal where
the parties have expressly authorized it to do so. Conversely, other
arbitration acts and the ICSID Convention contain no such
provisions.

105.
See Detlev Vagts, in RUBIN & NELSON, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
DISPUTES: AVOIDANCE AND SETTLEMENT 29, 36 (1985).
Cf. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 143-44 (W.
106.
Laurence Craig et al. eds., 1990) (referring to the unpublished ICC Award No. 5754).
See KROLL, supra note 72, at 15; Robert Briner, Special Considerations
107.
Which May Affect the Procedure (Interim Measures, Amiable Composition, Adaptation
of Contracts, Agreed Settlements), in INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION CONGRESS SERIES NO. 7, PLANNING EFFICIENT ARBITRATION
PROCEEDINGS: THE LAW APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 362, 370-71
(Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1996); KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ARBITRATION 85 (1993).

108.
Cf. Dutch Arbitration Act, art. 1020 para. 4 (d), reprinted in VAN DEN BERG,
THE NETHERLANDS ARBITRATION ACT 1986 11 (1987): "By agreement ... may also be
subject to arbitration: . :. the supplementation or alteration of legal relations." This
also covers adjusting contracts to fit changed circumstances, VAN DEN BERG, id. at 116.
Cf. PIETER SANDERS, Quo VADIS ARBITRATION? 167 (1999) ('The
109.
international commercial arbitration resolves civil property disputes arising from
foreign trade relations as well as disputes about filling of gaps in a contract or its
adaptation to newly arisen circumstances").
Article 1(2) of the Swedish Arbitration Act enables the parties to submit a
110.
dispute "over specific facts" or the filling of gaps in the contract to an arbitral tribunal,
cf. Berger, The Arbitration Agreement in the 1999 Swedish ArbitrationAct and the 1998
German ArbitrationAct, A ComparativeAnalysis, 17 ARB. INT'L 389, 394 (2001).
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Until now it has been recognized that a mere "conflict" or
difference of opinion between the parties was not sufficient for an
arbitration. "Dispute" turns out to be a narrower sub-category of
"conflict."'' An exact boundary between the two can scarcely be
drawn, and the transition is fluid. The weakened formulation
suggested during negotiations on the UNCITRAL Model Law,
according to which the existence of a "difference" of opinion would
suffice for an agreement to arbitrate, 1 12 was adopted neither by the
UNCITRAL Working Group nor by the German legislator who
adopted the Model Law in 1998.
This "dispute oriented" understanding of arbitration is also
visible in older English decisions that had to deal with the question of
whether a "dispute" existed between the parties that would justify
assuming the validity of the arbitration agreement between the
parties and hence the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal instead of
the national courts. 1 3 In fact, cases can be found in international
arbitration where the defendant challenged the jurisdiction by
114
arguing that no "dispute" between the parties existed.
In the context of the ICSID system, it is also assumed that the
arbitral tribunals are not authorized to adjust contracts, because in
these cases the tribunal is not deciding the parties' rights and
obligations." 5 The official commentary of the World Bank (Report of
the Executive Directors) on Article 25(1) ICSID Convention states in
Paragraph 26 that:
The expression 'legal dispute' has been used to make clear that while
conflicts of rights are within the jurisdiction of the Centre, mere
conflicts of interest are not. The dispute must concern the existence or

111.
BROWN & MARRIOTT, supra note 79, at 1-007.
112.
GAOR, UN Commission on International Trade Law on International
Contract Practices, $ 11.1-3, art. 2, UN Doc.AICN.9/WG.IIIWP.37 (1982) reprinted in
HOWARD M HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW

ON

INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION

278

(1989)

("to submit

to

arbitration all or certain differences").

Nova (Jersey) Knit Ltd v. Kammgarn Spinnerei GmbH, [1977] 1 LLOYD'S
113.
L.REP. 463, 467; Ellerine Brothers (Pty) Ltd. and Another v. Klinger, [1982] W.L.R.
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
1375,
1383; ADAM
SAMUEL, JURISDICTIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A STUDY OF BELGIAN, DUTCH, ENGLISH, FRENCH, SWEDISH,

SWISS, U.S. AND WEST GERMAN LAW 148 (1989); BERGER, supra note 107, at 80; BROWN
& MARRIOTT, supra note 79, nos. 1-010; cf. Halki Shipping Corp. v. Sopex Oils Ltd., 1
LLOYD'S L. REP. 465 (1998) (regarding the new British Arbitration Act).
114.

ICC Award No. 4265, reprinted in 111 J. DU DROIT INT'L 922 (1984).

115.
Cf. Delaume, supra note 104, at 117 ("disputes regarding conflicts of
interest between the parties, such as those involving the desirability of renegotiating
the entire agreement or certain of its term, would normally fall outside the scope of the
Convention"). Marcantonio, supra note 104, at 237. See also BERNARDINI, supra note
44, at 424 (suggesting the delegation of this task to a neutral third party who will then
make the decision outside of the ICSID Convention system).
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scope of a legal right or obligation, or the nature or extent of the
116
reparation to be made for breach of a legal obligation.

The chairman of the "Legal Committee" responsible for the draft of
the ICSID Convention was also of the opinion that differences of
opinion of the parties on contractual adjustment could not be
' 17
regarded as "disputes." "
The opinion of those responsible for the Convention seems to
suggest that a "legal dispute" in the sense of Article 25(1) ICSID
Convention only exists if the plaintiff makes a legal claim. 118
Therefore the adjustment of the contract by an ICSID arbitral
tribunal requires that the plaintiff can make a genuine claim:
[Tihe objective requirement of a legal dispute remains. The parties'
agreement cannot replace the limitation as contained in the Convention
entirely .... Where the parties do not agree on the wish to revise the
agreement, the claimant would have to present a convincing claim,
couched in legal terms, that he has a right to bona fide negotiations and
119
that the conditions for such renegotiations have been met.

Frequently, however, the plaintiff will only be able to indicate the
need for a contractual adjustment and the differences of opinion
between the parties as to the "right" adjustment decision.
4. Arbitration as a Means of Contract Adjustment
A multitude of modern developments supports the assumption of
a more extensive jurisdiction for arbitral tribunals, including the
authorization to adjust and adapt contracts.
a. Procedural Law
Factors in support of this, at a procedural level, are the
significantly greater arbitration-friendliness of national arbitration
acts in recent years, increasingly equal treatment of adjudication by
arbitral tribunals and by national courts, and the comprehensive

See also HIRSCH, supra note 98, at 58; HAPP, supra note 98, at 98. Report of
116.
the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes,
1965 I.L.M. 524.
117.
Cf. ICSID Doc. SIDILC/SR/4 of Dec. 21, 1964, at 3; Marcantonio, supra note
104, at 237.
Schreuer, supra note 104, at 339-40 (stating "the dispute will only qualify
118.
as legal if legal remedies such as restitution or damages are sought and if legal rights
based on, for example, treaties or legislation are claimed"); see also Delaume, supra
note 104, at 116-17; Marcantonio, supra note 104, at 237-38.
119.
Schreuer, supra note 104, at 344; see also Nigel S. Rodley, Some Aspects of
the World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
43, 55-57 (1966).
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120
recognition of party-autonomy as the leading maxim of arbitration.
Even under English law, which has traditionally rejected every
interference with the contract by the arbitral tribunal, 12 1 arbitrators
today are authorized to undertake such legal creativity to quite a
broad extent. Apart from the extremely arbitration-friendly attitude
of the new English Arbitration Act 1996, this flows from, above all,
the broad term "dispute," which forms the basis of the new English
law. As well as genuine legal disputes (disputes), it includes mere
differences of opinion (differences)1 22 and hence permits the express
transfer of the completion and adjustment jurisdiction to an arbitral
tribunal. Even without an express transfer of jurisdiction under
English law, in the case of contracts where performance has already
begun, a so-called "implied term" can be assumed according to which
the contract should be amended by a subsequent agreement. In the
interests of an efficient winding-up of the contract, the arbitral
tribunal should decide the interpretation of these implied contractual
terms where such an open contract is combined with an arbitration

agreement. 123

The broad understanding of the term "dispute" in international
case law is a point in favor of extending the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal in ICSID arbitration, which is based on international law.
According to the definition contained in the Mavromatis decision of
the Permanent International Court of Justice, it will suffice for the
assumption of a "dispute" that there is "a disagreement on a point of
law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between two
persons."'124 This broad definition was later confirmed in a series of
decisions by the International Court of Justice. 125 Even if the concept
of "dispute" in Article 25(1) ICSID Convention is additionally
qualified as a "legal dispute," an extension of ICSID arbitration
tribunals' jurisdiction can be argued based on this international case

120.
Cf.KROLL, supra note 72, at 63.
121.
Cf. Schmitthoff, supranote 24, at 82.
122.
Arbitration Act, 1996, art. 82(1) (Eng.) ("In this Part ... 'dispute' includes
any difference").
123.
Cf. Queensland Electricity Generating Bd. v. New Hope Collieries Pty.,
Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 205, 210 (1989); Vosper Thornycroft, Ltd. v. Ministry of Defense, 1
Lloyd's Rep. 58 (1976); F&G Sykes (Wessex), Ltd. v. Fine Fare, Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 53,
58 (1967); KROLL, supra note 72, at 96, 160.
124.
Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions (Greek Repub. v. U.K.), 1925 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 5, at 11 (Mar. 26).
125.
Application for Revision and Interpretation of the Judgment of Feb. 24,
1982, in the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya), 1985 I.C.J. 192, 192 (Dec. 10); Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate
under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of June 26, 1947,
1988 I.C.J. 12, 28 (Apr. 26); Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), 1995 I.C.J.
90, 99 (June 30).
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law in combination with the other procedural and material aspects
1 26
mentioned here.
Ren6 David predicted this trend of extending the jurisdiction of
international arbitrators decades ago under the heading "oneness of
arbitration" (unit de 1'arbitrage):
It is artificial and in many respects deplorable that a distinction should
be drawn between the two varieties of arbitration: the one aiming at
the settlement of a legal dispute, the other at the regulation of a
contractual relationship. In both cases the same technique is resorted
to, the same result is aimed at, and the application of the same rules is
127

desirable.

b. Contract Law: Sanctity of Contracts vs. Fairness
For some years, modern international contract doctrine has been
concerned with the formal rule of sanctity of contracts and the goal of
ensuring fairness in contractual relations. Today, one can observe a
trend to move away from a contractual model which is static and
"complete" at the time of conclusion and thus unalterable 128 and
towards a contractual understanding which is dynamic and therefore
unavoidably accepts interference by the parties or by third parties
that they have authorized. 129 Thus, the formal "all-or-nothing" rule of
the principle of sanctity of contracts (pacta sunt servanda) is often
130
replaced these days with a more flexible and pragmatic approach.
It attempts to guarantee that the rights and obligations set out in the
contract with regard to the economic background remain "fair" and
appropriate and consistent with the economic interests and
rationality of the parties, not just at the time of concluding the
contract but throughout its duration. This change in the paradigm of
international contract law is made possible by the fact that, even in

126.
See PETER, supra note 7, at 323 (referring to the system of the ICSID
Convention as isolated from national law).
127.

RENE DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 409 (1985); cf. Kolo &

Walde, supra note 4, at 33; BERNARDINI, supra note 44, at 422.
128.
Cf. M. Sornarajah, Supremacy of the Renegotiation Clause in International
Contracts, J. INT'L ARB. 97, 104 (1988) (in the context of renegotiation of international
contractual framework).
129.
Cf. BERNARDINI, supra note 44, at 422; BERGER, supra note 27, at 284; Kolo
& Wdlde, supra note 4, at 8.
130.

Cf. IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 4-10 (1980); NASSAR,

supra note 18, at 237; Asante, supra note 1, at 407 ("A blind insistence on the
application of pacta sunt servanda to such transnational contracts betrays a lack of
sophisticated appreciation of the nature and origin of such transactions, the inherent
instability in such long-term arrangements, and the formidable difficulties posed by
their administration").
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the common law, there is a growing reliance on behavior-linked
13 1
standards like "good faith," "fair dealing" or "reasonableness":
The current need for flexibility and co-operation, maintenance of
relations and adjustment in the context of transnational contractswhereby the contract is regarded as 'not merely a meeting point for
conflicting interests but also, to a certain extent, . . a common project
in which each party must . . . cooperate'-viewed against the legal
maxims of good faith and fair dealing, favor contractus and adjustment
132
to changed circumstances, form the 'new spirit' of contract law.

This idea of more flexible and dynamic contractual obligations has
always been valid to a particularly high degree in Concession and
Production Sharing contracts as prototypes of the long-term contract
associated with significant uncertainties at the time of concluding the
contract and subject to multiple economic influences throughout its
133
duration.
Few contracts
have been
as 'interactional'
as concession
agreements.... In this respect, the concession contract is quite
different from most agreements for the sale of goods, for example,
where the transaction may be precisely defined and may be quickly
concluded. Major uncertainties prevailing at the time a concession
contract is negotiated generally make it necessary to re-examine the
terms at a later time. In addition, the bargaining powers of the parties
to the agreement are likely to change over time, creating tensions that
generally lead to revisions. In fact, the need for change is so frequent
and compelling that revision or updating are probably more apt terms
to describe the process of evolution than is the frequently used term
renegotiation. 134

IV. SUMMARY

Renegotiation, particularly of fiscal terms, has been a feature of
135
the natural resources industry for the past twenty-five years.
However, adaptation of a Production Sharing agreement to changed
economic circumstances can only be considered if the contract
contains a renegotiation clause. This sort of clause is only effective if
it has been combined with an arbitration agreement, and in this way

131.
Cf. K.M. Sharma, From "Sanctity" to "Fairness":An Uneasy Transition in
the Law of Contracts, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. (1999) (citing Ian R. Macneil,
Commentary, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589,
593 (1974)).
132.
Doudko, supra note 9, at 488 (in connection with the official commentary to
Article 5.3 of the UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 11, which deals with the parties'
obligation to cooperate).
133.
BOCKSTIEGEL, supra note 17, at 335, 337 ("One cannot always rely on the
state being bound by the contract as long as rigidly as might be possible between
private partners"); see also Asante, supranote 1, at 407.
134.
SMITH & WELLS, supra note 6, at 127.
135.
Kolo & Wdlde, supra note 4, at 29.
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provides for a possible method of third party adjustment if the parties
are unable to reach an agreement. However, this requires that the
parties make clear that they wish to transfer to the tribunal this
"creative competence"
which goes beyond normal
dispute
adjudication, 136 as has been done, for example, in Article 34.12 of the
37
Model Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement of Qatar.'
The presence of a normal arbitration agreement in the contract will
not suffice for this purpose.' 38 Instead, an express allocation to the
arbitral tribunal of the competence to adapt the contract is
required. 1 39 In the AMINOIL decision already cited several times, the
tribunal expressed this principle clearly:
[T]here can be no doubt that, speaking generally, a tribunal cannot
substitute itself for the parties in order to ... modify a contract unless
that right is conferred upon it by law, or by the express consent of the
parties . . . arbitral tribunals cannot allow themselves to forget that
their powers are restricted. It is not open to doubt that an arbitral
tribunal-constituted on the basis of a 'compromissory' clause
contained in relevant agreements between the parties to the case . . .
could not, by way of modifying or completing a contract, prescribe how a
provision [for the determination of the economic equilibrium] must be
14 0
applied. For that, the consent of both parties would be necessary.

The better the parties are able to establish a concrete nexus
between the arbitral tribunal's creative competence and the areas of
adaptation or adjustment set out by way of the open clause in the
contract itself, the greater the guarantee of an effective allocation of
jurisdiction to the arbitral tribunal for such cases. 14 1 In individual
cases, this type of express allocation of competence may not be
possible due to the nature of the contract. If, however, the state has
given its "anticipated" consent to arbitration with the investor in a
bilateral investment treaty or other international treaty such as the
Energy Charter Treaty, 142 an arbitration agreement which could
serve as a basis for allocating jurisdiction will have never existed. In
these cases, one should think about providing for a solution to the
conflict by way of Mediation/Conciliation or having the arbitrators
decide as "amiable compositeurs" (ex aequo et bono). This freedom

136.
137.

KROLL, supra note 72, at 154; see also Kolo & Walde, supra note 4, at 46.

138.

BERNARDINI, supra note 44, at 411, 421 (noting that "...

Cf. supra note 44 and accompanying text.
the reference to

arbitration in case of failure by the parties to agree on the terms of the revision will not
be sufficient to imply such a power [to adapt the contract]").
139.
Cf. U.N. Model law, supra note 112, at 20; BERGER, supra note 88, at 82.
140.
See Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., 21 I.L.M. 976, 1016 (1982); MANN, supra
note 39, at 259.
141.

Cf. MARTIN HUNTER ET AL., THE FRESHFIELDS GUIDE TO ARBITRATION AND

ADR 45 (1993).
142.
Cf. supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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from the constraints of the applicable law is particularly suited to the
143
adjustment of long-term contracts to changed circumstances.
All these measures serve, more than anything else, the purpose
of avoiding contract adaptation by an arbitral tribunal altogether.
Contract adaptation and renegotiation are consensual procedures.
Legal arguments, positions, and principles mostly fade into the
background here. Rather, these processes are a matter of genuine
economic or even political considerations and estimations, which are
closely woven together with the distribution of negotiating power
between the parties and which may vary throughout the duration of

the contract. 44 These sorts of complex processes are not compatible
with the one-sided imposition of an adjustment by a neutral third
party, regardless of its function or the legal framework in which it
operates:
[N]o court or arbitrator in the world, at least in international business
transactions, can render an award that could serve as the legal basis
for a complex future cooperation against the will of one of the parties.
There are definite limits to the powers of arbitrators to adapt a
45
contract.1

See BOCKSTIEGEL supra note 33, at 335; BERGER, supra note 7, at 566;
143.
BERGER, supra note 4, at 282; Schreuer, supra note 104, at 344.
For example, on the investor's "prisoner's dilemma," see supra note 5 and
144.
accompanying text.
145.
Horn, supra note 8, at 173, 182 (1994).

